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Abstract
The discipline of academic philosophy suffers from serious problems of diversity and 
inclusion whose acknowledgement and amelioration are often resisted by members of 
our profession. In this paper, I distinguish four main modes of resistance – naïveté, 
conservatism, pride, and hostility – and describe how and why they manifest by using 
them as the basis for a typology of types of “resister”. This typology can hopefully be 
useful to those of us trying to counteract such resistance in ways sensitive to the differ-
ent motives and strategies that these resisters tend to employ.
1. Introduction
The discipline of academic philosophy has two closely related problems 
that relate to the complex set of issues gatherable under the label “diversity 
and inclusion”. The first is that academic philosophy has so far largely failed 
to respond significantly to the fact that it is ‘demographically challenged’, in 
the diplomatic phrase offered by Linda Martín Alcoff. Much of the concern 
concerns the underrepresentation of various groups, most obviously women, 
but also others, too. In the uS, for instance, there are depressingly few African 
American, Asian American, native American, and Latino philosophers. In the 
uK there are very few black philosophers, certainly when compared against the 
national demographic. Similar situations recur in other countries, reflecting 
the entrenched historical inequalities of the history of philosophy.
The second problem, my concern in this paper, is the depressing fact of the 
considerable resistance to efforts to positively and concretely respond to this “de-
mographic problem”. Though many philosophers are actively engaged in such 
ameliorative work, far too many still resist claims about the existence, extent, 
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causes, and urgency of the demographic problem. Such resistance is obvious to 
anyone with practical experience of trying to report and respond to the situations 
of marginalised and underrepresented groups and traditions in philosophy. Indeed, 
a main reason why philosophy has stubbornly remained in its demographically 
challenged state is surely because of the fact of effective resistance to that fact, and 
to the efforts of those trying to introduce ameliorative measures.
My aim in this paper is to survey some of the main reasons for resistance to 
efforts to respond positively to the demographic problem. I do this by offering 
a typology of resisters, of generalised types of person who resists and their rea-
sons for doing so. Although typologies have their limits and should not distract 
from structural factors, they also have their uses, not least as heuristics. I do not 
claim that this typology is definitive or exhaustive, nor that any given person 
can only occupy one “type” – indeed, resisters often shift type, adopting new 
modes of resistance if and when they are put under critical pressure. My hope 
is that thinking in terms of resisters qua agents is just as important as attending 
to the structural factors that motivate and enable resistance. 
2. The demographic problem
what Alcoff calls the demographic problem is indeed a genuine and urgent 
problem. Its reality and extent is increasingly recognised within the philosophical 
community and in recent years there have been encouraging signs of progress. 
Such signs include important reports by major subject associations, increasing 
awareness of implicit bias and stereotype threat, dedicated events on sexism and 
racism in the academy, empirical studies of the “leaky pipeline” for women, the 
Gendered Conference Campaign, the Minorities in Philosophy movement, and 
debates on blogs, around watercoolers, and over coffee at conferences1. Many of 
the developments build on a longer tradition of feminist philosophy and activ-
ism that only recently became mainstream. In her 2012 presidential address to 
the eastern apa, provocatively entitled “Philosophy’s Civil wars”, Alcoff was 
quick to remind us how slowly things change. It is a good thing if departments 
form equality and Inclusion Committees and if undergraduate courses include 
more women in their reading lists and if conferences commit to securing more 
female keynotes. But progress is slow and not always steady.
There are many reasons for such slow progress, not least the wider problems 
faced by academic philosophy, including financial, political, and practical pres-
sures. But a primary reason is the presence, within the discipline, of those whom 
we might call resisters: a person whose attitudes, assumptions and actions tend 
to prevent, delay, dilute, or otherwise undermine efforts to positively respond to 
1 Some very useful empirical studies include Botts et al 2014 and Dodds and Goddard 2013.
120
the demographic problem, for suspect reasons, of a sort outlined below. Clearly 
there are many types of resister, including some who occupy ‘grey areas’, such 
as those who are generally inefficient at getting anything done, or those who try 
to resist but are ineffective in doing so. My focus, however, are on those who 
are successful, at least to some degree, in effecting their resistance. That focus 
is justified on pragmatic reasons: since they are succeeding in blocking efforts 
to grasp and act on the demographic problem (and related problems), then we 
ought to start with them. 
The general category of “resister” needs three general comments. The first is 
that resisters can act individually or collectively, although most of my discus-
sion is of individual resisters, even though there are certainly groups of resisters. 
Second, “positively responding” to the demographic problem can involve many 
things, including acknowledging it, trying to understand it, or implementing 
measures to do something concrete about it, and resisters might fail to do 
one or more of these. The third point, perhaps the most important, is that a 
person can obviously question or challenge or criticise certain claims about the 
demographic problem and its solution in “good faith”. A colleague might raise 
worries about gender quotas, say, due to some genuine concern or principle. 
Perhaps they are performing the vital discursive role of Devil’s Advocate or are 
a Principled Critic acting on the basis of sincere moral objections to the sorts 
of solutions being proposed.
Such cases of putatively principled resistance are important and might be 
responded to one of two ways. In one set of cases, such as that of colleagues, 
one might know enough about the character and values of the putatively prin-
cipled resister to determine whether their motivations are genuine. It may be 
clear, to their colleagues, that the self-described Devil’s Advocate is implacably 
hostile to the “diversity and inclusion agenda”, but disguises this under a veil of 
critical procedure. But not every case is so easy, if, for instance, the Principled 
Critic is a stranger or a new colleague. So, in another set of cases, one will have 
to invite the resister to justify their resistance and make good on their worries. 
Suppose a Principled Critic insists that their course on early modern philosophy 
should be exempted from even minimal criteria for gender inclusion, given the 
lack of women in the period. A reasonable, respectful response to this Critic is to 
appraise them of the scholarship on women in the early modern period, maybe 
including examples of figures and texts to include. If so, the “lack of women” 
objection is weakened if not rebutted, such that further resistance along that line 
becomes more difficult. Ideally the Critic yields, but they might not. Instead, they 
might change tack, appealing instead to the integrity of the “canon”, at which 
point the process starts again. Perhaps they ought to be encouraged to engage 
with general studies in feminist history of philosophy – Genevieve Lloyd’s 1984 
classic The Man of Reason is an obvious choice – or the now-extensive literature 
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on women in early modern philosophy (see Atherton 1994 and o’neill 2005). 
If resistance cannot be justified, then surely it cannot be principled2.
Such experiences will be familiar to those who try to respond to the demo-
graphic problem in their capacities as course convenors, department chairs, journal 
editors, and so on. I give that case partly to show the dynamics of resistance, but 
also to make a point to justify my strategy of offering a typology: when you have 
a resister in mind, you are likely thinking of someone who was, is, or might be 
a colleague. The resister might be a mentor, supervisor, director of research, or 
head of department, or even a personal friend. To talk about and engage with 
resisters can therefore be difficult for a variety of interpersonal reasons – guilt, 
fear, bullying, unequal power relations, painful memories, fear of retaliation, or 
the pressures of hierarchy. The abuse of such negative feelings and experiences by 
those who marginalise and oppress the members of certain groups is well-known 
from other areas of progressive activism. Many resisters naturally exploit these 
facts of our intersubjective and professional lives to their advantage. Indeed, that 
is one reason why the demographic problem has persisted. So resistance must be 
taken to have both agential and structural features, even if my focus in this paper 
is on agential resistance3. 
3. Resisters
The typology sketched below is neither exhaustive nor definitive. It is a work-
in-progress and wholly open to expansion, modification, and revision. There are 
at least three reasons why a typology of resisters can be useful: pragmatic, evalu-
ative, and epistemic. To start with, typologies can have pragmatic value: efforts 
to counteract resistance are more likely to be effective if they are adapted to the 
specific reasons the resister will give to explain and defend their actions. next, 
certain types of resistance, and therefore of resister, are more morally objectionable 
than others in a way that we ought to attend to – misogyny is surely worse than 
naïveté, even if both can and do lead to resistance. And finally, thinking about 
typologies of agential resisters can be a source of knowledge and understanding. 
we can learn a lot about social psychology and the organisation of our institutional 
environments by studying the activities of resisters – as agents embedded in social 
and material structures. It is for these three reasons that a typology can have value.
2 The example of gender quotas in the early modern canon should not be generalized. I do 
not rule out the possibility of there being genuinely good reasons for exempting certain modules 
from gender quotas, but with two provisos. First, one can often do better, in terms of gender 
balance, than one supposes – not least given the abundance of online resources for those who 
wish to diversify their courses. Second, one could at the least acknowledge that certain courses 
are “boy’s clubs” to students – a small gesture, but better than nothing.
3 I thank Shannon Dea for emphasising the structural aspects of resistance.
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There are five specific points to make about resisters qua agents, before I go 
on to the typology. First, a resister need not be motivated by any specific hostil-
ity to women, blacks, or members of other marginalised social groups: many 
resisters are sexist and racist, but not all. In some cases, resistance is rooted in 
laziness, obstinacy, or contrariness in isolation from any sexist, racist, or otherwise 
prejudiced hostility. Indeed, it is important to emphasise that many resisters are 
genuinely motivated by a desire to do what they feel is best for philosophy – to 
“invite the best speakers”, say, or “teach the best philosophy” – and think their 
current efforts accomplish this, at least to a better degree than alternatives. 
other resisters might be concerned to protect their academic freedom against 
what they see as the pernicious intrusion of quotas, ideological diktats, and 
the like. Many of these resisters are likely guilty of naïveté – of a sort described 
below – but the outcome is still to prevent, delay, or dilute positive responses 
to the demographic problem, in a way that is consequentially indistinguishable 
from misogyny and other more nefarious motivations.
Second, a resister is more problematic if they occupy a position of power 
within their department, community, or the discipline at a large. A resister 
might now, or in the future, be a director of graduate studies, department 
chair, journal editor, president of a learned society, or a “big name” with a 
“voice”. Such powerful resisters have a power to enact their resistance at both 
the personal and the social levels – for instance, by extending their refusal to 
ensure gender balance in their course reading list onto the influential journal 
that they edit. If so, practical efforts should focus on them rather than on less 
influential, “junior” resisters.
Third, it is likely that many resisters developed their attitudes and values due 
to the nefarious effects of bad role models. Perhaps their doctoral supervisor 
openly sneered at “feminist grumbling”. Perhaps the “world leader” in their 
department dismisses talk of diversity and inclusion as “junk”. Perhaps the “big 
names” in one’s discipline are contemptuous of what they see as politically cor-
rect efforts to insidiously “socially engineer” philosophy. The fact of poor role 
models does not excuse resistance, but it should inform how we engage with 
resisters. It should also play a greater role in our reflections as a community 
on our practices and criteria for the training and professionalisation of junior 
philosophers.
Fourth, resisters can be, and often are, members of those various social groups 
that are marginalised within philosophy. Many women philosophers are critical 
of and resistant to efforts to improve the situation for women in philosophy. 
Some might think it bad to “single out” women for perceived special treatment, 
while others might think that certain proposals are objectionable. If the resistance 
of women to such efforts sounds strange, it shouldn’t. Some women think that 
it is character-building to have to fight one’s way to the top, such that a fairer 
playing field is, in fact, to the disadvantage of junior women philosophers. Some 
may think it unfair that junior women are afforded advantages denied to them. 
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Some are opposed on principle to what they see as discriminative “affirmative 
action” that select for gender or race rather than proven philosophical ability. 
And so on.
Fifth, even small acts by resisters can have large effects. Some perverse law of 
social mechanics dictates that it often takes a lot of energy to implement mea-
sures to respond to the demographic problem, but only a little effort to block 
or undo them. Such disproportional investments of energy are often exploited 
by resisters, who know that creating a tense climate in a department meeting 
through a few charged outbursts will upset discussion. But of course this is why 
we must think about resistance at both its agential and structural levels. It also 
points to the need for careful studies of the sorts of social structures that might 
amplify the effects of those ameliorative measures – a topic for another paper.
4. A typology of resisters
I will describe four main types of resister, each to be taken as generalised types 
of person who resists efforts to positively respond to the demographic problem. 
The typology is empirically based insofar as it is informed by the experiences 
of those engaged in efforts to respond to the demographic problem. It is also 
worth noting two features of the typology. one is that an individual agent need 
not fall into one type to the exclusion of others. Indeed, modes of resistance 
can and do shade into one another, merging and interacting. The other is that 
resisters can and do change type, especially if put under critical pressure: a re-
sister may begin with naïveté, but, if educated, switch to conservatism. I hope 
that part of the value of the typology is that it enables us to identify and track 
a resister’s shifting reasons and select and adapt corrective strategies in response.
(i) The naïf 
The first type of resister is the naïf, a person who resists due to empirical, 
psychological, or conceptual naïveté – a term more conciliatory than the obvi-
ous alternative, “ignorance”. Some philosophers are unaware of the fact, extent, 
or severity of the demographic problem, of a sort that could be corrected by 
education of training. But, until that point, the naïf might genuinely believe 
there is no demographic problem, or that, even if there is, that it is not as 
severe as “They” say, or that, even if there are problems, there are no problems 
here – and so on: indeed, such resistance loops can be prolonged for a very long 
time. A naïf might start by denying the existence of the demographic problem, 
then shift to doubting its severity or its extent, or its application to their home 
department – and so on. But the resistance is sustained by ignorance or naïveté 
and so is, in principle, correctible through informing, education, and training.
naïveté can be understood as having three roughly separable aspects. The 
first is empirical naïveté, an ignorance of the relevant statistical, empirical, and 
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anecdotal data concerning the demographic problem. Maybe the naïf has not 
read the major reports on the situation for women in philosophy, such as Women 
in Philosophy in the UK, a joint report by the British Philosophical Association 
and Society for women in Philosophy-uK published in 2007. Maybe the naïf 
has not read, and may be unaware of, the blog What Is It like to Be a Woman 
in Philosophy and other relevant online fora. Maybe their bookshelves are not 
graced by collections like Singing in the Fire (Alcoff 2003) or the recent ed-
ited collection Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? (hutchinson and 
Jenkins 2013). Maybe the naïf has not trawled through the statistics gathered 
by higher education authorities and publicised in the philosophy blogosphere 
that document the demographic problem (see http://www.apaonlinecsw.org/). 
Taken together, the naïf is likely to be empirically naïve insofar as their positive 
perceptions of their discipline are due to a lack of information about the actual 
realities (Paxton et al 2012 and Thompson et al 2016).
The second is psychological naïveté, a lack of knowledge and understanding of 
the biases and other suboptimal features of human psychology that are relevant 
to the demographic problem. Central among these is implicit bias, which the naïf 
may be unaware of or might have passed off as a trendy “hot topic”, alongside 
stereotype threat and other phenomena (see Saul 2013). Maybe the naïf does 
not grasp the distinction between implicit and explicit biases and so naively sup-
poses that their lack of explicit sexist and racist bias thereby entails that they do 
not discriminate against women and blacks. Maybe the naïf is unaware that the 
majority of human beings tested – 98 percent, apparently – have a variety of 
implicit biases, and also unaware that thinking of oneself as “objective” actually 
amplifies the power of those biases. And so on. Such naïveté is widespread and 
has real effects in stifling efforts to respond to the demographic problem. I once 
attended a meeting where a colleague rejected a call for modest gender quotas 
on the grounds that philosophers ought to aspire to an “ideal of intellectual 
purity” – to be unbiased, impartial, and assess philosophers only on their merits. 
A noble ideal, for sure, but also hopelessly psychologically naïve.
The third is conceptual naïveté, a lack of the concepts required to properly 
understand the statistical, psychological, and other aspects of the demographic 
problem. It is easy to keep a positive view of the situation within philosophy 
for various social groups if one is naïve: if one lacks concepts like chilly climate 
or a microaggression or a leaky pipeline, without which one will struggle to make 
sense of the data that flash by on a PowerPoint slide (see The Chilly Collective 
1995). The naïf may suppose that women choose to leave philosophy simply 
because they decide that it is not for them – or that the paucity of reports of 
sexual assault must mean that one’s department is safe for women – or that 
certain students may not be speaking in class simply because they ‘learn by 
listening’ rather than because their confidence has been systematically eroded by 
a lifetime of gendered and racialized microaggression. Such judgements reflect 
conceptual naïveté – not to mention a lack of engagement with the rich testi-
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monies offered by women and others who feel alienated by and in philosophy. 
As feminist philosophers showed long ago, if we lack certain concepts, then we 
will tend to fail to identify and understand certain types of social experiences. 
Philosophers who lack the concept of a microaggression or a chilly climate will 
find it very difficult to grasp certain facts about their classrooms and staffrooms. 
Instead they will tend to be ignorant about the very existence of the complex 
and cumulative behaviours that can ‘chill’ those environments. The effect is a 
naively optimistic evaluation of how inclusive and welcoming those classrooms 
and staffrooms are of a sort that will stifle proposals for robust investigation and 
amelioration.
Taken together, the naïf lacks the empirical, psychological, and conceptual 
resources needed in order to properly understand the demographic problem. 
Because of this, they fail to grasp its significance and so are led to resist it – why 
make such extensive changes to how we organise our communities if things aren’t, 
as far as one can see, as bad as “They” say? In a worst-case scenario, a naïf will 
lack the relevant data and the concepts and knowledge needed to make sense 
of them. Part of the objection to the naïf is, of course, that is it not always hard 
to make good on that lack – to read the reports, attend implicit bias training, 
and so on. This is obviously easier if departments make such resources available, 
either formally as part of a staff training day or through a Diversity and Inclu-
sion Committee or by a visiting speaker. But providing training is one another; 
making people attend is another. People are busy, for sure, and training sessions 
can be tedious. But those are poor reasons to persist in naïveté when its conse-
quences are the persistence of the demographic problem (see Puddifoot 2015). 
It is better to admit to naïveté and attend a training session, then acquiesce in 
ignorance, especially when the ignorance pertains to such fundamental moral 
and intellectual issues.
(ii) The conservative
The second type of resister is the conservative, one who resist efforts to 
respond to the demographic problem due to a desire to preserve established 
norms, practices, and cultures (see haslanger 2008). Conservatism is not in 
itself automatically a bad thing, of course, since many of the things that we 
do – and the ways that we do them – are genuinely good and admirable. But 
worries ought to arise when we have good reasons to be rethink our confidence 
that our ways are good ones, whether those reasons flow from our own reflec-
tions or the testimonies and criticisms of others. The “bad” conservative will 
be prone not only to want to preserve some or all of the status quo, but also to 
resist or silence or exclude those potential critics.
The conservative resister of the bad sort is one who resists changes that ought 
to be made for moral, epistemic, or other reasons – most obviously, the sorts of 
changes that addressing the demographic problem will require. A conservative 
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resister likes things the way they are and wants to carry on doing things the 
way they have always been done, even if that means allowing the structures and 
values that generate and sustain the demographic problem to persist. Perhaps 
the conservative wants to stick to “the way things have always been done”, or 
has their course “just the way they like it”, or has a fixed sense of how a depart-
ment ought to be run. Perhaps they prefer ways of doing that are tried or tested 
or enjoy continuity with the past – a desire often reinforced by the cultures of 
proudly traditional institutions with a strong sense of the past. If a person uses 
these sorts of desires and preferences to justify a failure to respond constructively 
to the demographic problem, then that person is a conservative resister.
Such conservatism can flow from different sources. Some might be lazy or 
otherwise disinclined to put in the work needed to modify reading lists, write 
new lectures, redesign courses, enact new policies, commit to new rules for 
selecting seminar speakers – and so on. others might have deeper sources of 
resistance than indolence. Certain conservative resisters perceive in current ef-
forts to improve the diversity and inclusiveness of philosophy the thin edge of 
the wedge. A fear arises that once departments, societies, and journals start to 
go down the path of “inclusion and diversity”, things will be set in motion that 
will drastically change the identity and direction of academic philosophy, for the 
worse. A conservative is prone to worry that once they “submit” to the greater 
inclusion of women in their course, they will be met with more demands – for 
the inclusion of black philosophers, gay philosophers, trans philosophers, and 
so on. A call to include Confucius into a course on ethics will soon be followed 
by another for an Indian philosopher, too – and so on. 
The mention of Confucius points to a very rich contemporary example of 
the conservative mode of resistance, described recently by Amy olberding, a 
scholar of Chinese philosophy and advocate of the study of that tradition by 
philosophers working mainly in the western tradition – not least by engaging 
in metaphilosophical reflection (see olberding 2015). Commenting on a Daily 
Nous article about a proposed expansion of the philosophical canon to include 
“non-western” traditions, olberding described a variety of typical forms of 
conservative resistance that such proposals elicit:
– Someone will simultaneously profess not to know non-western sources and 
express skepticism that the sources are philosophical;
– Someone will offer argument that – hey! – there are some good things out 
there and here’s a list of some (which, if ensuing future iterations of nearly 
identical blog conversations are indication, most everyone will ignore);
– Someone will make claims along the lines of “I once read something in that 
area and it wasn’t very good” and thereby ostensibly settle the matter for us all;
– Someone will offer incredibly condescending remarks purporting to explain 
what philosophy is (once and for all! in a blog comment!) and, well, there 
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it is, non-western stuff just, alas, doesn’t fit (not that there’s anything wrong 
with that!);
– Someone will play precision-mongerer and take issue with some minutiae 
in any proposed expansion and insist that change ought stop dead in its 
tracks till we sort out this tiny detail;
– Someone will point out that as mere mortals with limited budgets, we can’t 
be expected to do everything (or presumably even anything where non-
western traditions are concerned)4.
each of these forms of conservative resistance are, of course, argumentatively 
impoverished or otherwise intellectually unimpressive. The best way to assess the 
merits of Chinese and other “non-western” traditions is to study the primary 
texts in conjunction with the scholarly literature in an intellectually humble 
and reasoned manner. It is the failure of conservative resisters to conform to 
these utterly basic epistemic norms that is so objectionable. 
The selective observance of such basic norms by the conservative is obvi-
ously explicable by reference to the strongly affective nature of their resistance. 
underlying their resistance will often be alarm and anxiety, as they perceive 
a long-term shift in the trajectory of their discipline, a fear that can be well 
or badly motivated. It is good to have historiographical concerns about the 
philosophical canon and quite proper to pay heed to the classic texts of the 
tradition. But what critics typically call for is a rethinking of the content of 
the canon and sensitivity to the contingent prejudices that affect the sorts of 
people who, historically, got to “do” philosophy. I teach a course on the history 
of western philosophy, covering fifteen figures, ancient to modern. It includes 
familiar figures, like Plato and Kant, but also others who ensure that the line-up 
is fairly gender balanced and inclusive of various “unusual suspects”, including 
Islamic and “Continental” philosophers. The course is also explicit about the 
gendered and racial biases evident in the views of certain figures – in Aristotle 
and Kant, for instance – and that helped to shape the western tradition at large. 
But such inclusion and reflexivity, if carefully done, need not entail an abuse 
of the tradition or its “big names”. If done well, it can enable students to be 
critically respectful of the familiar and also appreciative of the unfamiliar, such 
that a conservative resister cannot reasonably complain about abandonment of 
the classics and the canon. At the least, that would be a worry to be expressed 
and appraised, not just assumed and asserted.
An especially objectionable type of conservative resister is the one motivated 
by self-interest. It is obvious, even to a naïf, that successfully responding to the 
demographic problem would have significant implications for the discipline’s 
4 The article is Philosophical diversity in U.S. philosophy departments (updated), “Daily nous”, 
11th May 2016 and olberding’s comment is dated 12th May 2016.
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composition and status quo. The reading lists and course curricula and job 
market are already overcrowded and the sundry epistemic and professional 
goods of philosophy are finite. unless our resources suddenly expand, there 
are only so many jobs, so many slots in a seminar series, and so on – and this 
can prompt a conservative to want to keep things the way they are, since that 
is their best strategy for maximising their own prospects for success. A conser-
vative once opined to me that “it’s grand to be a man in a man’s world”, and 
he spoke a truth, one rooted in the long history of western philosophy as a 
culturally privileged intellectual and professional domain of “the man of reason”. 
There is often understandable reluctance to transform the discipline in ways 
that constitute a surrendering of those inherited privileges. Such an attitude is 
understandable, but still unacceptable given that it results in the perpetuation 
of a culture that structurally disadvantages philosophers from a variety of social 
groups – not to mention those many philosophical disciplines and traditions 
that are also marginalised.
(iii) The proud
The third type of resister is the proud, who resists proposed efforts to improve 
the diversity and inclusiveness of philosophy because they perceive in them 
criticisms of their personal character, intellectual integrity, or professional pride. 
Since for a philosopher, those aspects often roll together – and not always in 
healthy ways – a challenge to one will likely resonate with the others. 
A proud resister might, for instance, interpret the suggestion that they improve 
the gender or racial balance of their reading lists as a charge of sexism or racism. 
If so, they are likely to be stung by the perceived accusation of bigoted preju-
dice and take it as an insulting and offensive affront to their personal character. 
Such charges can, after all, cut deep, perhaps especially for senior philosophers 
nearing the end of their careers for whom charges of implicit bias can resonate 
across an entire career. Proud resistance can also arise from perceived attacks on 
one’s intellectual integrity. Many of the calls to act on the demographic problem 
unavoidably impute to philosophers a degree of intellectual error, if of a culpable 
sort. This could be thought about at two levels.
At the “global” level, the proud might worry that talk of the demographic 
problem, especially if construed as an historical as well as contemporary phe-
nomenon, will undermine the integrity of philosophy. Since a philosopher’s 
self-image is rooted partly in their status as participants in that tradition, any 
perceived attack on the tradition can rebound on them. The inherited self-image 
of philosophy as the rational enterprise par excellence conducted under strict 
disciplined conditions of objectivity is both entrenched and powerful. Because 
that self-image is a deep source of confidence, self-identity and pride for many 
philosophers, it is quite natural for them to want to protect and defend it. But 
the self-image that guides our conduct and life should also be true and accurate 
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one rather than distorted or self-serving. It’s crucial therefore to critically reflect 
upon the inherited self-images that circulate within our communities rather 
than uncritically adopt them.
At the “personal” level, it is easy to hear a call to undertake a gender balance 
survey for one’s course as a charge that one lacks the requisite competence or 
skills – for monitoring and intervention is surely only required where one has 
reasons to think one is going badly. In such cases, naïveté and pride can be 
mutually reinforcing: the resister wants to stick with their course in its current 
form because they are unaware of the psychological and other factors that might 
have distorted its design. Pride in the course one has carefully developed is li-
able to be punctured by a realisation that its design reflects implicit biases and 
other phenomena. It is easy to see why a call to include figure x, or tradition 
y, or approach z can be easily taken as accusations – one is ignorant of x and 
is overlooking y and is inexplicably leaving out z. Such calls need not be taken 
that way, but of course often are.
I suspect that a main reason why the proud resister reacts as they do is that 
the calls that provoke them come from those who are (or are perceived as) 
junior or subordinate to them. In my experience in the uK and Ireland, the 
various phenomena gathered into the demographic problem are the concern 
of a diversity and inclusion committee (or something similar). These groups 
usually share a common social profile: their members mainly tend to be women 
staff members, early career philosophers, postgraduates – many on fixed-term or 
part-time contracts – and also sometimes undergraduates. not all groups share 
this profile, but most do, and these social profiles have two unfortunate conse-
quences. one is that those members are often professionally vulnerable, in ways 
that affect their confidence and capacities to act – an early career philosopher, 
anxious about the job market, will quite naturally want to avoid controversy 
and jeopardise the prospects of a good reference and other means of support. 
Another is that activists for diversity often lack the sorts of social and profes-
sional power one really needs to get things done, especially if the resisters they 
face are senior, tenured, or otherwise powerful. 
Such asymmetries of power and status are often exploited by resisters, especially 
if their pride is stung by (what they see as) the presumption of inexperienced, 
self-appointed, junior staff who are, as they see it, “dictating” how they ought 
to conduct their professional affairs: call this the “whippersnapper reaction”. 
But proud resistance is neither exclusive nor peculiar to senior philosophers, 
since junior philosophers can exhibit it too, even if only in latent forms. A 
junior philosopher may have taken a certain senior colleague as an exemplar 
to emulate, such that criticisms of them are transitively felt to rebound back 
upon them. If one’s personal and professional pride is partly invested in one’s 
successful emulation of a senior exemplar, then any criticism of the exemplar 
will be felt by the junior. Moreover, a junior philosopher’s pride will be invested 
in their sense of their place within and success and prospects relative to the 
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philosophical landscape. If so, a challenge to the landscape on the grounds, for 
instance, of its gender imbalance or racial exclusions, can be experienced as an 
assault upon the grounds upon which one is building one’s career and identity. 
Proud resistance is therefore a risk for philosophers both junior and senior5.
The relationship of pride, power relations, and social realities should be taken 
seriously by anyone engaged in efforts to respond positively to the demographic 
problem.
(iv) The hostile 
The final type of resister I want to describe is the hostile, a person who resists 
due to hostility to the interests and situation of one or more of the underrepre-
sented groups in philosophy. hostiles can include racists, sexists, homophobes, 
transphobes, chauvinists and eurocentrists, and others inveterately hostile to 
‘other’ persons, groups, and traditions.
A hostile resister may take pleasure from acting injuriously towards individuals 
who are or are perceived to belong to those groups. Such resisters are therefore 
motivated to strive to protect the departmental and disciplinary norms and 
cultures that enable their deleterious behaviour. Perhaps they try to maintain 
institutional cultures that fail to take seriously reports of sexual assault or racial 
abuse. Perhaps they want to keep gay, queer, and trans philosophers out of the 
discipline. Perhaps they are “good old-fashioned sexists” and run-of-the-mill 
racists. I do not have rich data on the incidence of such hostile resisters, but 
the reports reported on blogs and other sources indicate that they do exist – in 
philosophy and in wider society.
The hostility in question can be directed at two different things. The first 
are people, both individuals and groups: a hostile resister could be sexist, racist, 
ableist, homophobic, transphobic or otherwise negatively prejudiced against 
some group of people. Perhaps they believe that members of those groups are 
incapable of effective philosophising, or that the discipline suffers little for their 
absence, or is better off without them. If so, that resister aims to resist measures 
that would include and represent those people within the discipline’s ranks, 
history, and self-image. Some of these hostile resisters will fall into the worst 
sub-type: the sexual predators who abuse their power and status to sexually 
aggress women – a fact documented with tremendous courage in several posts 
on the What is it like to be a woman in philosophy blog.
Although hostility to persons is the worst sort, some other resisters are moti-
vated by hostility to intellectual targets, such as traditions, methodologies, and 
disciplines. It is crucial that this sort of resistance does not indicate informed 
acquaintance or reasoned objection. I have heard philosophers dismiss the 
topic of epistemic injustice (“that Fricker stuff”) and decolonial epistemology 
5 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising the prospect of “proud juniors”.
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(“deological pseudo-epistemology”) and Daoism (“Asian mystical crap”). Some-
times resistance to ideas or traditions could result from naïveté, conservative, or 
pride, but sometimes – if only in rare cases – the reason really does seem to be 
a xenophobic aversion to culturally other people and traditions or a chauvin-
ist privileging of one’s own tradition, or both. The claim here is not that these 
other topics and traditions should be given carte blanche and included without 
question into our research and teaching – tokenistically included to satisfy the 
demands of “political correctness” or whatever. It is instead the position that 
there are excellent philosophical and scholarly reasons to suppose that these 
other intellectual disciplines and traditions merit critical investigation and fair 
evaluation rather than the usual dismissive responses that they too often meet. 
Interestingly, teaching is a case where hostility can be effectively challenged. I 
hope that exposure to a range of culturally and intellectually diverse philosophical 
traditions, methods, and ideas can prevent students from an all-too-easy drift 
into the hostility of ignorance. An average undergraduate philosophy course in 
the uK will feature little if any of the philosophical figures, texts, or traditions 
of India and China, let alone of Africa or Latin America. There may be a little 
Buddhism tucked into the philosophy of religion course, but even that will tend 
to frame that tradition in narrow ways. Many history of Philosophy courses 
are actually confined to the history of western tradition and will still tend to 
neglect Islamic philosophy. And so on.
happily this is slowly starting to change, at least in certain departments, but 
there is still huge scope for teachers of philosophy to intellectually and demo-
graphically diversify their syllabi. we could expand the scope of our teaching to 
philosophy, rather than to certain of the forms it has taken in certain times and 
climes (see Cooper 2003 and Garfield and van norden 2016). Student initiatives 
like the Diversity Reading List in Philosophy and the uP Directory are welcome 
steps in that direction6. The limits of our philosophy courses are not due solely 
or primarily to hostility, of course, since they reflect the messy contingencies of 
history and of culture and the limits on our resources. But such contingencies 
are apt to be encouraged and exploited by resisters.
5. Conclusions
My aim was to contribute to practical efforts to respond positively to the 
demographic problem in philosophy by sketching a typology of “resisters”. It is 
neither definitive nor exhaustive, but ought to be judged on its practical con-
tributions to projects for the reform of philosophy. I hope it might help those 
6 See http://www.diversityreadinglist.org/ and http://www.theupdirectory.com/.
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working for diversity and inclusion in philosophy, whether at the local level of 
a department or community or at large within the wider profession. 
Certainly there is more work to do in identifying and mapping the reasons 
for, and modes of, resistance to that work. If the typology holds true for your 
own experiences, that’s well and good, but if not, it might still be of use as a 
heuristic tool. If a colleague twists and turns under critical pressure, then one can 
see then shifting awkwardly between different types – an initially naïve resister is 
dragged or badgered into attending a Diversity in Philosophy workshop and so 
can no longer seriously deny the demographic problem. So, they switch gears, 
now starting to give conservative reasons – maybe conceding the problem but 
warning against precipitate action. how a resister will behave in such situations 
cannot always be predicted. People can and do surprise as well as disappoint 
and as the disciplinary climate changes, things will hopefully improve – but 
only if that climate incorporates understanding of the forms of resistance and 
the forms of counter-resistance that are effective against them.
happily, some resisters respond very positively and quickly exchange their 
naïveté for clear understanding of the problem and real commitment to address-
ing it – a commendable, admirable choice. But others – call them recalcitrant 
resisters – will refuse to yield, due to personal psychology, corrupting formative 
experiences, or other factors. If so, at least we have a polite term for them.
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